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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned
Law Professors identified in Appendix A and AARP.1
Law Professors teach and write about patents,
intellectual property, health, science, and constitutional law. Law Professors are concerned that the
Patent Act should be construed consistently with: (1)
the constitutional premise that the patent system
does not authorize private ownership of scientific
principles, natural materials and abstract ideas; and
(2) historic enforcement of that premise by requiring
invention to exist in the application of any science,
nature, and ideas.
AARP is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization
that helps people over the age of 50 to have independence, choice and control in ways that are beneficial
to them and society as a whole. AARP has nearly 40
million members. AARP works to foster the health
and economic security of individuals as they age, to
ensure access to high quality and economical health
care, and to ensure that older people have viable
retirement options. AARP has previously filed briefs
in this Court on the limits of what is patent eligible.
In Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., No. 04-607, AARP described
the adverse effects of patents for natural phenomena
1 Letters of the Parties’ general consent to file amicus briefs
are on file with the Court. This brief was not authored in
whole or in part by counsel for any party. No one other than
Amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution to
preparing or submitting this brief.

2
claimed as medical diagnostic methods. AARP has
an interest in this case because of the trend to find
“business methods” that are abstract ideas applied
without any invention to be patent eligible. Such
methods, including retirement plan methods, strategies and designs, limit the retirement options available to older people. Granting such patents also
increases the cost of retirement plans and may lead
to misconceptions that particular plans are government approved or legitimate. Upholding the patent
eligibility of the claimed business method in this
case would likely open the gates to patents on noninventive applications of science and nature, which
would adversely affect medical research and diagnostic and treatment options. Patent incentives are
not needed for such discoveries or applications.
Science, nature, and ideas (claimed as such or
without invention in their application) for centuries
consistently have been held to be excluded from the
patent system.
Accordingly, the patent system
generally has promoted scientific and technological
development for human benefit. A broad interpretation of the Patent Act that would authorize the
eligibility of non-inventive applications of science,
nature, or ideas would extend the patent system
beyond the limits that Congress has approved and
would raise serious constitutional conflicts that
should be avoided. It would also threaten continued
scientific, technological, and other advances. Amici
urge the Court to avoid this result.

3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The patent system of the United States, like
that of other countries, excludes from its ambit
scientific principles, natural materials, and abstract
ideas. Since the 19th Century, this Court has distinguished patentable inventions from ineligible discoveries of science, nature, and ideas by determining
whether there is any invention in their application,
i.e., any creative, technological advance beyond
merely applying the newly discovered or previously
known science, nature, and ideas to a particular
context. The “invention in the application” test of
eligibility: performs a necessary gate-keeping role
that is distinct from the patentability criteria of
novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of disclosure; explains this Court’s machine or transformation precedents and why particularity or tangibility
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
eligibility; and elucidates why the claims at issue
here are ineligible. These claims are non-inventive
applications of the abstract idea of hedging the risks
of fixed-price, variable-volume purchases, limited
only to the field of commodities.
Neither the Constitution nor the Patent Act
authorizes patents for non-inventive applications of
public domain science, nature, and ideas. The
Constitution authorizes exclusive rights only for
“Discoveries” of “Inventors,” and the Patent Act has
consistently been interpreted to preclude patents for
scientific, natural, or conceptual discoveries, claimed
as such or without invention in their application.
The 1952 Act’s definitional changes did not alter this
requirement. Interpreting Section 101 (alone or
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with Section 273(b)) to authorize such claims would
raise serious Constitutional conflicts that should be
avoided. Such patents would not be for “Discoveries”
of “Inventors,” would extend beyond the “useful Arts”
and would impede rather than “Promote the
Progress” as they would propertize the building
blocks of science, technology and other learning.
Such patents are and should remain prohibited.
ARGUMENT
I.

For a Claim Applying Science,
Nature, or Ideas to Be Eligible,
There Must Be Invention in the
Application.

This case raises the most basic question of patent law: what kinds of discoveries or inventions can
be protected by the patent system? The patent
system does not exist to provide incentives for all
forms of creative human endeavor. That its reach is
limited avoids burdening the patent system with
non-technological activities or discoveries, such as
literary, artistic, and other non-functional expressions protected by copyright.2 More significantly,
the limits on the patent system avoid burdening
society by propertizing fundamental knowledge and
pre-existing natural materials. Thus, it is a common
premise that patent systems may not authorize
private ownership of “‘“[a] principle in the abstract,”
... [p]henomena of nature, though just discovered,
2 Cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 101-03 (1879)
(discussing limits to the copyright system and its relation to the
patent system).
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mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
... as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”3
Discoveries of phenomena of nature are unpatentable under two foundational premises: (1) they
are not themselves the products of human invention,
regardless of the investments and creative efforts
leading to their identification; and (2) the patent
system must not subject such discoveries to private
property rights because they should be free for all
humanity to share.4 Discoveries of phenomena of
3 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 591-92 (1978) (quoting
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Le Roy v.
Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1853))). See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (“EPC”), arts.
52(2)(a)&(c), Oct. 5, 1973 (as amended), 13 I.L.M. 268 (“discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;” and
“schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers”
are not patentable inventions); Patent Law of the Peoples
Republic of China, arts. 25(1)&(2), translation at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/laws/lawsregulations/2008
04/t20080416_380327.html; Patents Act, 1970 (India) (as
amended),
§
3(c),
available
at
http://ipindia.nic.in/
ipr/patent/patents.htm.
4 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“‘free to
all men and reserved exclusively to none’”) (quoting Funk Bros.
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). See
generally 17 The Parliamentary History of England col. 999
(William Cobbett ed., 1806-20) (1774) (Lord Camden) (“science
and learning” are by nature “common to all mankind” and
“ought to be as free and general as air or water.”) (“Parliamentary History”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (pt. 3 continued), 77
J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 847, 855 (1995) (“Walterscheid,
Antecedents”).
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nature thus are not “Discoveries” of “Inventors”
within the Constitution’s grant of authority.5 Although abstract intellectual concepts may be human
creations,6 they are also outside the patent system.
Such patents would restrict the public’s right to
5 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (stating that “discovery
is something less than invention”); Anthony W. Deller, The
United States patent system, in Mainly on patents: The use of
industrial property and its literature 50-52 (Felix Liebesny ed.,
1972) (distinguishing “‘mere discovery’” from invention)
(quoting Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 882
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865)); Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 350, 356 (William S. Hein & Co. 2002) (noting
that the Framers appeared to view “Discoveries” and “Inventors” to be synonymous, and that under English common law
patents “did not cover principles of nature”) (“Walterscheid,
Study”); id. at 365-66, 375-76 (arguing that “Discoveries” of
“Inventors” are limited to the “useful arts,” which excludes
“anything not made or created by man”). See also Linda J.
Demaine and Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the
Biotechnology Patent, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 303, 370-74 (2002)
(discussing historical evidence that patentable discoveries did
not include “merely something found”).
6 Because all patent claims are intellectual concepts expressed
in language having physical embodiments, they could be
viewed as “abstract ideas.” See, e.g., Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 386 (1996); Walterscheid,
Antecedents, supra, at 849 (describing how disclosure of the
concept of the invention became the consideration for the
patent grant). This raises a level of generality problem regarding which human-created ideas are the fundamental tools for
further innovation that must be in the public domain upon
their disclosure. In contrast, all discoveries of science and
nature must be so treated.
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benefit immediately from the discoverer’s disclosure.7 Therefore, all patent systems must distinguish claims to unpatentable discoveries of scientific
principles, naturally occurring materials, and abstract ideas (“science, nature, and ideas”) from
claims to patent-eligible human inventions.8 Line
drawing to separate patentable inventions from
unpatentable discoveries is necessary to protect the
public domain.9
7 See, e.g., 1 William C. Robinson, The Law of Patents for
Useful Inventions 37-44 (Little, Brown 1890). See also id. at 44
(“methods of agriculture and commerce, the metaphysical and
moral truths, and all other inventions which do not relate to
the industrial arts, belong at once, upon their publication, to all
mankind”).
8 In foreign systems, such line drawing may occur in legislative
or judicial definitions of “invention,” in requirements for
“technical effect” in claimed applications of science, nature, or
ideas, or in requirements for “industrial applicability.” See,
e.g., Patent Act (Japan), art. 2(1), translation at
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf; European
Patent Office, Revision of the European Patent Convention
(EPC 2000) Synoptic Presentation of EPC 1973/2000 – Part I:
The Articles, EPO Official J. 48 (Spec. Ed. 4 2007), available at
http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj007/08_07/special_edition_4_e
pc_2000_synoptic.pdf; Patent Cooperation Treaty, art. 33(4),
June 19, 1970 (as amended), 28 U.S.T. 7645. See generally
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the
Light of Comparative Law I, 102 U. Penn. L. Rev. 291, 302
(1954).
9 Similar concerns animate the copyright doctrine of merger,
which precludes protection for an author’s expression if it
“would effectively accord protection to the idea itself,” because
“ideas are too important to the advancement of knowledge to
permit them to be under private ownership.” CCC Info. Servs.,
Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Repts., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 (2d
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In the United States, this Court has drawn a
consistent line when interpreting the statutory
categories of patentable subject matter.10 The Court
has required invention to exist in the application of
any previously known or newly discovered science,
nature, or ideas.11 “‘If there is to be invention from
such a discovery, it must come from the application
of the law of nature to a new and useful end.’”12
Moreover, the invention (i.e., the creative, technological advance13) must reside in the application,
rather than in a discovery preceding or employed by
it.14 This is because the science, nature, or ideas
Cir. 1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d
Cir. 1991). See Baker, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) at 103.
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“any … process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter”).
11 “Application” here refers not to the document submitted, but
to the implementation made of science, nature, and ideas, e.g.,
improving steam engines employing thermodynamic principles.
See Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 652-53 (1795)
12 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 n.11 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co.,
333 U.S. at 130).
13See, e.g., 1 Robinson, supra, at 93-94 (surveying legal efforts
to define “invention”).
14 See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am.,
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) (“We assume, without deciding the point,
that this advance was invention even though it was achieved by
the logical application of a known scientific law to a familiar
type of antenna.”) (emphasis added); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d
1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Archer, C.J., dissenting)
(“The requirement of the patent law that an invention or
discovery reside in the application of an abstract idea, law of
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must be treated as if they are already in the prior
art, i.e., are publicly known and free for all to use.15
Absent invention in applying such discoveries, there
is simply no invention to patent.
To emphasize this point, this Court in Parker
v. Flook stated that “the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some
other inventive concept in its application.”16 There,
the claimed process for catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons “contain[ed] no claim of patentable invention,” because the only creative advance was an
improved mathematical method of calculating a
process variable, which had to be treated as if it
were already known. The mere application of the
new math in the context of the hydrocarbon process
was not a technological invention (any more than
would be using a new mathematical formula to
calculate a useful measurement).17 The need for
another, and an inventive, concept in the claimed
application of any scientific, natural, or conceptual
discovery is critical, because the patent system does
not exist to reward scientific, natural, or conceptual

nature, principle, or natural phenomenon is embodied in the
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101”) (emphasis in original).
15 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185; Flook, 437 U.S. at 592
(citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 115 (1853)).
16 Flook, 439 U.S. at 594 (emphasis added).
17 See id. at 594-95.
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endeavors, but to create incentives for invention.18
The Constitution and Section 101 thus bar the gate
to non-inventive, piecemeal incursions on the public
domain of science, nature, and ideas, even though
the claimed applications may be new and do not
foreclose other applications.
A.

The Invention in the Application
Test Performs a Necessary GateKeeping Role, Different from
Novelty,
Non-Obviousness,
and
Adequacy of Disclosure.

As this Court has held and should reiterate
here, the invention in the application test of eligibility pertains to all product and process claims,19 even
though the literal language of Section 101 is broad.20
Moreover, the test pertains even though the claimed
application of science, nature, or ideas is wholly new
under Section 102.21 If novelty were all that was
required for eligibility, this Court’s precedents would

18 See, e.g., Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification
of the Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 32 J. Pat. Off.
Soc’y 83, 87 (1950).
19 See. e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 n.11 (citing Benson, 409 U.S.
at 68); Flook, 437 U.S. at 600 n.3 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (Benson “foreclose[d] a
purely literal reading of § 101.”).
21 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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have reached very different results.22 Rather, the
test pertains to newly created things and activities,
whether or not the science, nature, or idea employed
by the claimed invention was previously known.23
This Court has held that eligibility test pertains when “consider[ing the claims] as a whole”24
and without “dissect[ing] the claims into old and new
elements.”25 Rather than requiring analysis of
which elements or steps of the claims are new, the
test requires identifying the kind of discovery or
invention made. One must still determine what (if
anything) the invention consists of, to assure that
the claim as a whole contains a technological advance relative to the public domain science, nature,
and ideas on which it relies.26
22 See. e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co., 333 U.S. at 130-31 (although
Bond “made a new and different composition.… we think that
that [the claimed, novel] aggregation of species fell short of
invention within the meaning of the patent statutes”); Flook,
437 U.S. at 588 (refusing to find the claim eligible where
novelty existed, but only in using a new mathematical formula
in “an otherwise conventional method”). Cf. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 448 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (“Here, by contrast, the
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different
characteristics from any found in nature....”) (emphasis added).
23 See, e.g., Flook, 437 U.S. at 591-92 (“[T]he novelty of the
mathematical algorithm is not a determining factor at all.”).
24 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594. See id. at 588.
25 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
26 Some amici make this point in the particularly troubling
context of claims for which the only advance resides in a claim
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The invention in the application test also pertains without considering the qualitative degree of
any advance, beyond what was previously known in
the art, to determine if a patent is warranted. That
is the subject of non-obviousness analysis under
Section 103.27 Although Section 103 could be used
to exclude claims for non-inventive applications of
science, nature, and ideas,28 it is not an effective
substitute for Section 101.
step requiring performance of a mental act, with information
that the patent itself discloses. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus
Curiae Law Professor Kevin Emerson Collins at 1-8. But the
invention in the application test is not limited to that context.
Other amici suggest that the discovery of a previously existing,
unexpected property provides for eligibility so long as the
claimed application (as a whole) is new and useful. See, e.g.,
Brief of Amici Curiae 20 Law and Business Professors at 3.
But such a discovery is unpatentable and must be treated as if
it were publicly known. For eligibility, there must be another,
and inventive, concept beyond merely using that property.
27 35 U.S.C. § 103. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S.
(11 How.) 248, 265 (1851); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S.
192, 200 (1883). See generally Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost
of the “Invention” Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26, 29-34 (197273) (noting that a qualitative “invention” requirement is
reflected in the Constitution’s restriction to “Inventors”;
discussing the history of the invention standard preceding and
following Hotchkiss, and the legislative effort to establish in
Section 103 a clearer qualitative standard by reference to
“unobviousness” of the “subject matter as a whole”); Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 335-44 (discussing arguments for a
qualitative invention standard in the Constitution).
28 See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 220 (1976).
Because science, nature, and ideas must be treated as if
publicly known, for any non-obvious invention to exist in a
claim applying such discoveries it must exist in the application.
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Section 101 provides clear public notice that
the public domain of science, nature, and ideas is
outside the boundaries of the patent system. The
gate-keeping role of Section 101 minimizes burdens
on the patent system, by barring all claims lacking
any invention in the application.29 Section 101 thus
poses a less complicated and less resource-intensive
initial analysis than patentability evaluations under
Section 103. The Section 101 analysis usually can be
made on the face of the specification, because its
disclosure must explain the nature of the invention.
The disclosure enables a threshold decision on
eligibility,30 before engaging in costly judicial or
administrative fact-finding and qualitative legal
evaluation of sufficiency of the advance under Section 103.31 The focus on legal sufficiency also masks
29 Some amici argue that patentability doctrines, such as
novelty, obviousness, and utility can weed out “bad” patents,
and that yet other doctrines such as declaratory challenges and
restrictions on injunctive relief can minimize their adverse
effects. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 20 Law and Business
Professors at 25-30. But none of these doctrines provide the
threshold, gate-keeping benefits of Section 101 by avoiding
such harms categorically.
30 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89; id. at 213 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
31 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18
(1966) (discussing the required factual analyses, including
differences between the claimed invention and the prior art and
the level of skill in the art, and noting that the “ultimate
question … is one of law”); KSR Int’l. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 416, 427 (2007) (discussing the reasons for the
obviousness requirement, which “is a legal determination”).
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the clarity of public notice regarding the limits of the
patent system, impeding the development of rules of
exclusion that can provide private guidance.
Further, the invention in the application test
pertains without considering the correlation between
the claimed advance disclosed and the breadth of
exclusive rights granted. That is the subject of the
written description and enablement requirements of
Section 112, first paragraph.32 Applicants do not
create the science or nature that they discover, and
are not entitled to claim them, abstract ideas, or
non-inventive applications thereof.33 This is true
even when the claimed applications (and thus the
exclusive rights) are limited in scope, are capable of
being made and used, and are sufficiently described.
Thus, Section 101 performs a role that Section 112
cannot.
In contrast, ineligible claims for non-

32 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1.
33 See, e.g., O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 113 (“In fine he claims an
exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not
described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not
describe when he obtained his patent.”) (emphasis added). Cf.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that before 1930
artificially bred plants were thought to be products of nature
and incapable of an adequate written description, and that the
Plant Patent Act changed the view of their status and relaxed
the written description requirement); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 133-35 (2001)
(same, noting that the Plant Patent Act was not meant to
exclude plant protection under the predecessor to Section 101,
even though they were not then thought to fall within that
provision).
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inventive applications of science, nature and ideas
also may conflict with Section 112 requirements.34
The invention in the application test cannot be
evaded by adding non-inventive limits that restrict
the scope of claims, even if doing so necessarily
avoids preempting all possible uses of previously
known or newly discovered science, nature, and
ideas.35 Artful drafting of field-of-use restrictions,
insignificant additional structures, trivial physical
transformations, or other non-inventive claim limitations may reflect legal skill, but does not impart
patent eligibility.36 Such limits may restrict scope,
34 See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277
U.S. 245, 257 (1928) (“That the patentee may not by claiming a
patent on the result or function of a machine extend his patent
to devices or mechanisms not described in the patent is well
understood.”). See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff, Shaking the
Foundations of Patentable Subject Matter 61-63 (unpublished
draft Apr. 2008) (discussing how the 1836 Patent Act’s requirement for clear claims provided another doctrinal basis for
excluding patents on natural discoveries, by prohibiting
overbreadth and abstractness), at http://www.wcl.american.
edu/pijip/go/research-and-advocacy/ip-policy-and-law-reform.
35 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192 n.14 (“The claims [in Flook],
however, did not cover every conceivable application of the
formula. We rejected in Flook the argument that because all
possible uses of the mathematical formula were not preempted, the claim should be eligible for patent protection.”).
Cf. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590 n.11 (“it is not entirely clear why a
process claim is any more or less patentable because the
specific end use contemplated is the only one for which the
algorithm has any practical application”).
36 See, e.g., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92; Flook, 437 U.S. at 590;
Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 72.
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but add “nothing ... of significance” to the otherwise
patent-ineligible discovery.37
The Court of Appeals below, however, focused
on this Court’s dicta in Benson and Diehr to highlight “[t]he question” of whether the claim would
“pre-empt substantially all” applications of science,
nature, and ideas.38 But as this Court held in
Dolbear v. American Bell Telegraph Co.,39 preemption is not the right question. After describing Bell’s
patented “discovery” and “art” as a particular method of placing electric current in a specific condition
for use in sound transmission,40 the Court held that
the invention was a pioneering (i.e., a highly inventive) application of the principles of electromagnetism, limited to the particular process claimed. The
Court then noted that the claim would not be invalid

37 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548
U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal as
improvidently granted) (also noting restrictions on the claim’s
scope and physical transformations in performing the process).
See Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (referring to such artful claim
drafting as “direct attempts” to claim computer programs). Cf.
EPC, supra, art. 52(3) (prohibiting eligibility of excluded
categories “as such”).
38 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
See id. at 952-53 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, and Diehr,
450 U.S. at 187-88).
39 126 U.S. 1 (1888).
40 Id. at 534-35.
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even if it were the only way to accomplish the result—and thus would preempt all ways of doing so.41
The Court should clarify here that preemption
is not the test for patent eligibility. Claims that limit
scope but lack invention in the application of science,
nature or ideas necessarily avoid preemption.
Rather, preemption is the consequence of improperly
claiming science, nature, or ideas without invention
in the application and without any other significant
limits on the scope of application of such a discovery.
B.

Particularity or Tangibility, Which
Is Required by the Machine or
Transformation
Precedents,
Is
Insufficient Without Invention in
the Application.

The invention in the application test explains
the proper application of this Court’s precedents
regarding patent eligibility for process claims tied to
a machine (or other structure) or that result in a
physical transformation. This Court has referred to
the machine and transformation precedents as “the
clue” to patent eligibility, and the Court of Appeals
below elevated them (at least for now) to an exclu-

41 See id. at 535 (“It may be that … practically, his patent
gives him its exclusive use for that purpose…. It will, if true,
show more clearly the great importance of his discovery, but it
will not invalidate his patent.”). See also In re Tarczy-Hornoch,
397 F.2d 856, 860 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (en banc); id. at 869 (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting).
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sive test of eligibility.42 However, merely tying a
process claim to some specific machine or having
some kind of tangible effect will not impart eligibility
without invention in the application. The same is
true for claims in the other subject matter categories, which also recite particular things or have
tangible effects when used.43
For the first century of American patent law,
doubts were initially expressed about, and later this
Court explicitly prohibited, claiming processes that
were not restricted to particular physical machines
or implementing structures.44 This was because
patents for processes that were not limited to particular, invented structures would claim scientific
principles or abstract ideas (specific results) without
any invention in their application.45
42 Benson, 409 U.S. at 64, 70 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94
U.S. (4 Otto) 780, 787-88 (1876). See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954,
956.
43 Cf. Brief for the Respondent at 36 n.14 (the machine-ortransformation test is separate from the preemption test).
44 See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 517 (1818)
(Story, J., App. Note II, On the Patent Laws); O’Reilly, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) at 116, 119; and Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 252, 268-69 (1853). See also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas.
1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568); Barrett v. Hall, 2 F.
Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047); Wyeth v. Stone,
30 F. Cas. 723, 727 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (No. 18,107); Howe v.
Abbott, 12 F. Cas. 656, 657-58 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 6,766).
See generally Sarnoff, supra, at 63-83.
45 Corning thus held that process claims were invalid when
they exceeded the disclosed modes (or machines) for
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This Court first authorized patents for inventive processes that were not limited to the disclosed
physical means for accomplishing a result (or to
similar machines or structures operating on the
same principles) in Cochrane v. Deener.46 For patent
eligibility of a process that was not tied to a particular machine, however, Cochrane required that it
must be “a mode of treatment of certain materials to
produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of
acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing....
The process requires that certain things should be
done with certain substances....”47
Thus, after Cochrane, patent eligibility for
processes could be found when the claim reflected
invention either: (1) in the particular machine (or
structure) implementing a discovery, rather than in
a non-inventive application performed with any or
with no machine; or (2) by transforming certain
substances, which were understood as tangible
implementing them. See 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 269 (“His patent
having a title which claims a machine, and his specification
describing a machine, to construe his claim as for the function,
effect, or result of his machine, would certainly endanger, if not
destroy, its validity.”). Similarly, O’Reilly held that “the patent
was not supported because this [scientific] principle [of using
electromagnetism] was embodied in it.... [I]t was supported,
because he had invented a mechanical apparatus.” 56 U.S. (15
How.) at 116. See id. at 119 (“by the use of certain means”).
46 94 U.S. (4 Otto) at 787-88.
47 Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
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objects.48 But even for physical or chemical transformations, invention was still required in the application of scientific principles.
Applying an old
process or structure to a new but analogous substance or use may have employed a particular machine or applied to a tangible object. But it did not
constitute invention, and such claims were not
patent eligible.49
48 See, e.g., 1 Robinson, supra, at 178–79 (explaining that
mental operations are not complete inventive acts, as they
cannot produce physical effects, and thus are “neither ‘a thing
made,’ nor ‘a manner of making’”); Giles S. Rich, The Relation
between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J.
Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 159, 171 (1942) (explaining that
for an invention—“a product of the mind”—“[t]o be patentable
it must be capable of being embodied in a tangible form as an
article of manufacture, machine, device or composition of
matter or as a method or process which can be carried out by
physical means”).
49 See, e.g., Ansonia Brass & Copper Co. v. Elec. Supply Co.,
144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892) (“[N]othing is better settled in this court
than that the application of an old process to a new and
analogous purpose does not involve invention, even if the new
result had not before been contemplated.”) (emphasis added);
Howe, 12 F. Cas. at 658 (“The application of an old process to
manufacture an article, to which it had never before been
applied, is not a patentable invention. There must be some
new process, or some new machinery used, to produce the
result.”). The premise for this approach was the belief that all
uses (even those not contemplated) were inherent in the
inventive principle of a machine or a process, and only the first
inventor of the thing or process was entitled to a patent. In
contrast, non-analogous uses involved a different inventive
principle, and thus the new uses or application to new things
could be patented. See Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 144 U.S.
at 18–19. See also 1 Robinson, supra, at 119–23. But cf. In re
Thuau, 135 F.2d 344, 347 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (holding that all new
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Following Cochrane and Dolbear, disputes
raged through the next century regarding the validity of claims to the function of a disclosed machine
(i.e., an effect or result), which would extend process
or structure claims beyond the disclosed uses or
machines to other uses or machines.50 But these
cases addressed claim scope rather than eligibility.
The patents at issue disclosed particular machines
reflecting invention in the application, but the claims
covered all processes or machines for accomplishing
the same result.51
In sum, this Court’s precedents require for the
eligibility of process claims either particular implementing structures (machines) or application to
certain tangible substances (transformations). But
under these precedents, particularity or tangibility
were necessary, not sufficient, conditions for eligibility; by particular machines and tangible substances
were meant inventive applications.52 That a claim
uses are not a new “art” under the statute, and might make
vendors secondarily liable based on their customers’ activities).
50 See, e.g., Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d at 858–65 (citing, inter
alia, Risdon Locomotive Works v. Medart, 158 U.S. 68 (1894),
Westingthouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1897),
Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1908), and
Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1934)).
51 Later cases held that Risdon Locomotive Works should not
be understood as prohibiting all mechanical process patents.
See, e.g., Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d at 863 (citations omitted).
52 Morse’s claim to a symbolic code “for telegraphic purposes”
is not to the contrary. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 86. See supra note
45. That claim need not be construed as untethered to the
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requires the use of a particular machine or application to a specific, tangible substance may not make
the application inventive. Recent decisions of the
Court of Appeals have failed to recognize the need
for invention in applications of discoveries using
particular machines or achieving tangible transformations.53 Similarly, recent decisions have improperly focused on what the information generated
represents, rather than on what the invention is.54
C.

The Claims At Issue Are Ineligible,
Non-Inventive Applications of an
Abstract Idea.

In the instant case, the Court must determine
whether there is invention in the application of an
disclosed, inventive telegraph machine for its use. Even if it
were so construed, there may have been invention in the
claimed, particular application of the abstract idea of using
symbols to transmit information. But in that case, machines or
transformations may be unnecessary as well as insufficient.
53 See, e.g.,State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., Appeal No.
2008-1403, 2009 WL 2950232, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 16, 2009).
Respondent similarly fails to appreciate this point. See Brief
for the Respondent at 40 (suggesting that a physical transformation in an assaying step is sufficient for eligibility of a
medical diagnostic process applying a discovered phenomenon).
54 Compare Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1544, and Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053,
1059–61 (Fed.Cir.1992), with In re Abele, 864 F.2d 902, 907–09
(C.C.P.A. 1982), In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795–96 (C.C.P.A.
1982), and In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839–40 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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“abstract idea.” In Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,55 this Court explained what was meant by an
abstract idea. After analyzing the specification, the
Court determined that the claim was for a pencil
eraser (without the pencil and not limited to a particular shape) having a cavity smaller than a pencil
to elastically hold the eraser onto a pencil. But the
public already possessed general knowledge of the
elasticity of erasers and of putting things into elastic
eraser cavities. Thus, the only thing “left for this
patentee” (i.e., the only valid claim to creative advance) was the specific idea that if one inserts a
pencil into a smaller rubber cavity the rubber will
cling to the pencil.56 The Court then noted that “an
idea of itself is not patentable” and held that the
claimed eraser—the “new device by which it [the
unpatentable idea that the elastic property of rubber
is triggered when a pencil is inserted] may be made
practically useful” —was not new (and thus was not
The Court thereby identified the
inventive).57
unpatentable “abstract idea” as either a property of
rubber (elasticity) or a result that was sought (binding to pencils).
The category of “abstract ideas” thus reflects
either functional properties on which claimed inventions operate or results to be achieved by employing

55 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874).
56 Id. at 507.
57 Id.
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those properties.58 For either, there must be invention in the application to establish eligibility. This
was made clear in Marconi Wireless Telegraph
Company of America v. United States.59 The Court
held that the abstract ideas of tuning a radio antenna circuit (which also was not new) and of substituting a known structure to better accomplish the
tuning were not patent-eligible inventions.60
“[M]erely making a known element of a known
combination adjustable by a means of adjustment
known to the art, when no new or unexpected result
is obtained is not invention.”61 Marconi Wireless
Telegraph not only demonstrates the eligibility
requirement for a creative technological advance
when applying a functional property or a result. It
also explains the precedents for claims to combinations of elements that lack any significant new
function. Lacking any patent-eligible invention,
such claims also lack any non-obvious invention.62

58 See, e.g., Le Roy, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175 (explaining that
invention does not exist in the discovery of motivating powers
or properties, but “in applying them to useful objects”); id. (“A
patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain
process, as that would prohibit all other persons from making
the same thing by any means whatsoever.”).
59 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
60 See id. at 32–36, 49.
61 Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
62 See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415–17 (citing United
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), Anderson’s-Black Rock,
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In the present case, the Court should affirm
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s rejection of
Petitioners’ claims at issue.63 Those claims (whether or not restricted to a specified mathematical
formula64) reflect only non-inventive applications of
the abstract idea of hedging risk. That result is
achieved by the non-inventive process of having a
middle-man enter into contracts that balance out
uncertain sales amounts at fixed prices (like the
slightly more common process of balancing uncertain
prices for fixed amounts). The claimed process: (1)
lacks any creative, technological advance in any
particular structure to implement it or in any tangible transformation that it achieves; and (2) is restricted in its scope only by a field-of-use limitation
to the context of commodity purchases.65 The claims
Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), and Sakraida
v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976)).
63 See U.S. Pat. App. No. 08/833,892.
64 See Brief for the Petitioners at 7–8.
65 See id. at 3-6; id. at 7 (Claim 1). Nothing in Claim 1 is
limited to energy supplies (or fluctuations in prices due to
weather variations). Nothing requires any particular method
(including Monte-Carlo modeling) to determine the “fixed price”
or the “fixed rate based on historical averages.” Id. at 7. See
id. at 5–6. Rather, the fixed price could be based on collected
and averaged data from a particular consumer’s past use over
some unspecified period of time, at a price the consumer is
willing to accept. Claim 4 (if before the Court) only limits
Claim 1 to the field of energy commodities (where prices are
sensitive to weather), and (possibly) to mathematically calculating the fixed price according to a formula with various data
inputs (given that “determined by the relationship” could mean
“reflects” and no calculation may be required). Id. at 8. If
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lack any new discovery or invention at all, much less
invention in the application of the abstract idea of
hedging risk. This is true even though the claims do
not preempt all applications of hedging and even if
some claims may sometimes effectively require a
general-purpose computer to do the math to implement them.66 This Court should bar these claims at
the threshold.
II.

Neither the Constitution Nor the Patent
Act Authorizes Patents For NonInventive Applications of Science,
Nature and Ideas.

Before the end of the 18th Century, it was unequivocally recognized at English common law that
scientific principles, naturally occurring materials,
and abstract ideas were not susceptible to private
ownership by patents granted under the Statute of
Monopolies.67 Scientists who made such discoveries
were morally obliged to freely disseminate that
knowledge for social benefit.68 Once such discoveClaim 4 contains any creativity beyond Claim 1, it must lie in
data gathering, which is not part of the claim, or in the mathematical formula, which must be treated as prior art.
66 Cf. id. at 7. Claim 4 does not specify the iterations (i) in the
formula, and thus may entail a trivial calculation if calculation
is required, although data therefor may be difficult to obtain.
67 See, e.g., Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (interpreting 21 Jac.
1, c. 3, § 6 (1623)).
68 See, e.g., 17 Parliamentary History, supra¸ at col. 999
(scientists are “intrusted by Providence with the delegated

27
ries were disclosed in a patent application, they were
required be treated as if they were already known.69
If any invention existed to support a patent, it must
therefore have been in the application of science,
nature, and ideas.70 It was with these understandings that the relevant constitutional and statutory
provisions were enacted.

power of imparting to their fellow-creatures that instruction
which heaven meant for universal benefit; they must not be
niggards to the world, or hoard up for themselves the common
stock”); 1 Robinson, supra, at 39 (“To benefit by the discoveries
of his fellow-men is thus not only a natural right, it is also the
natural duty which every man owes to himself and to society;
and the mutual, universal progress thence resulting is the
fulfillment of the earthly destiny of the human race.”).
69 See Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266, 1273 (1841)
(“We think the case must be considered as if, the principle being
well known, the plaintiff had first invented a mode of applying
it by a mechanical apparatus to furnaces; and his invention
then consists in this [structural arrangement]....”) (emphasis
added). See also Flook, 437 U.S. at 592 & n.13 (citing, inter
alia, O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 115, and Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S.
707 (1880)).
70 See Boulton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667 (Lord Eyre, C.J.) (“Undoubtedly there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a
principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition to act and to produce effects in
any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, I think there
may be a patent); id. at 663 (Buller, J.) (“But then it was said,
that though an idea or a principle alone would not support the
patent, yet that an idea reduced into practice, or a practical
application of the principle was a good foundation for a patent,
and was the present case.”).
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Nothing in the Constitution’s record or in the
contemporaneous statutory enactments suggests any
intent to depart from the deeply held English belief
that science, nature, and ideas could not be patented
because they were to be free to all for use.71 Judicial
decisions from the early 19th Century interpreting
the Patent Act unequivocally state this restriction on
patentable subject matter.72 Judicial decisions and
treatises from later in the century emphatically
repeat the point, treating the constitutional and
statutory language as limited to inventions.73
The earliest explicit statement to this effect by
this Court is in the second half of the 19th Century,
in Le Roy v. Tatham: “A principle, in the abstract, is
71 See, e.g., Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 309–27, 348–51
(discussing the evidence from the records of the Constitution
and the 1790 and 1793 Acts).
72 See, e.g., Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019 (“It has been often
decided, that a patent cannot be legally obtained for a mere
philosophical or abstract theory.”). “Philosophical” was then
understood to mean pertaining to the natural sciences. See,
e.g., The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 180
(Oxford Univ. Press 1971).
73 See, e g., In re Kemper, 14 F.Cas. 286, 287 (C.C.D. D.C. 1841)
(No. 7,687) (“‘Invention differs from discovery.’... A discovery,
in this sense, is not the subject of a patent; and it will be found,
by a careful perusal of the constitution and laws of the United
States upon the subject of patents for useful arts, &c., that it is
not there used in this sense, but always as synonymous with
invention.”) (citing Webster’s dictionary); Albert H. Walker,
Text-book of the Patent Laws of the United States of America 2
(2d ed. 1889) (“The word ‘discovery’ does not have either in the
Constitution or the statute, its broadest signification. It means
invention, in those documents, and in them it means nothing
else.”).
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a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive;
these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in
either of them an exclusive right.”74 O’Reilly repeated the point, and made clear that such new
discoveries were to be treated (as in England) as if
they were publicly known.75 And by the middle of
the 20th Century, Funk Brothers Seed Co. clarified
that “[i]f there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of
nature to a new and useful end.”76 Congress revised
Section 101 shortly thereafter, without changing the
requirement for invention in the application.
A.

The Changes Made in the 1952
Patent Act Did Not Alter the
Invention in the Application Test.

In Section 101, Congress recodified without
relevant change the statutory eligibility language
that was then in existence, while making certain
specific changes to the definitions in Section 100.77
Congress thus preserved the judicial interpretations
that had been developed, except to the extent they
were affected by the definitional changes.78 Section
74 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 175.
75 See 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 115–16 (quoting Neilson).
76 333 U.S. at 130.
77 See, e.g., H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6 (1952)
78 See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (ratification is implied when

30
100 of the Patent Act defined “invention” to include
“invention or discovery” without substantive change,
so as to simplify the statute’s language.79 Section
101 also changed the archaic term “art” to “process,”
and Section 100 defined “process” to include both
“method” and “new uses of a known” product or
process.80 These changes made clear (as this Court’s
cases had held) that processes and new uses were
potentially eligible, but did not affect the exclusions
for science, nature, and ideas nor alter the requirement for invention to exist in their application.81
In particular, the addition of the “new use”
provision reversed earlier appellate cases suggesting
that inventive creativity could never exist in applying an old structure or process to a new use.82 The
Congress “reenacts statutory language that has been given a
consistent judicial construction”).
79 See, e.g., Pasquale J. Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 161, 175 (1993)
(1954) (explaining that the old statute used “invention or
discovery” in many places; the new definition allowed use of the
singular “invention”).
80 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a) & (b), 101. See H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6.
81 See, e.g., H.R. Rept. 82-1928, at 6; Riesenfeld, supra, at 301
(explaining that “it must not be concluded that the well established rule which excludes the mere discovery of natural laws
and phenomena or the scientific explanation of the operation of
known devices or processes from the realm of patentable
inventions has lost its recognition”).
82 See, e.g., Howe, 12 F. Cas. at 658. But cf. Ansonia Brass &
Copper Co., 144 U.S. at 18.
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issue was brought to legislative attention by In re
Thuau, which had deemed new uses of existing
products to be beyond the statutory language—as
not a new art—even though the new use was inventive.83 However, in rejecting the Thuau doctrine
and its extreme prohibition on patenting inventive
new uses, Congress did not adopt the opposite extreme position of authorizing patents for noninventive new uses.84 Nothing in the history indicates any intent to alter the requirement for invention in the application. Accordingly, since enactment
of Section 100(b), this Court has consistently af-

83 See Riesenfeld, supra, at 298 (citing Thuau, 135 F.2d at
347).
84 See, e.g., id. at 299–300 (“[T]he background of the amendment gives reason to assume that a newly discovered use for a
known substance, machine or process is still only patentable if
it is not merely analogous or cognate to the uses heretofore
made.... [I]t is fair to state that in essence the new statutory
definition of ‘process’ restores the broad principles of patentability flowing from a careful analysis of the exposition given by
the Supreme Court in the Ansonia case.”); Federico, supra, at
177–78 (“The reference to the new use of a known machine or
manufacture in the definition [in Section 100(b)] merely means
that processes may utilize old machines or manufactures and
the reference to the new use of a known process simply indicates that the procedural steps in a patentable process might
be old.”). Cf. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 144 U.S. at 18 (“[I]f
an old device or process be put to a new use, which is not
analogous to the old one, and the adaptation of such process to
the new use is of such a character as to require the exercise of
inventive skill to produce it, such new use will not be denied the
merit of patentability.”) (emphasis added).
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firmed the requirement for invention in any application of science, nature, and ideas.
B.

Interpreting the Patent Act to
Authorize
Patents
for
NonInventive
Applications
Would
Conflict With the Limits in the
Constitution.

Interpreting Section 101 of the Patent Act—by
itself or in light of Section 273(b)85—so broadly as to
authorize eligibility of non-inventive applications
would conflict with this Court’s consistent statutory
interpretation that science, nature, and ideas are
unpatentable. It also would raise serious constitutional conflicts that should be avoided.86 Patent
eligibility for non-inventive applications of science,
nature, and ideas would conflict with the constitutional premise that patents should issue only for
“Discoveries” of “Inventors.”87 Similarly, such broad
eligibility would conflict with the limitation of the
85 35 U.S.C. § 273(b). When enacting Section 273(b), Congress
expressed its concern over the effects of the Federal Circuit’s
new and expansive interpretation. See, e.g., Cong. Rec. S14836
(Nov. 18, 1999). By enacting a separate restriction to limit
those effects, Congress neither approved of the broad eligibility
language of State Street Bank nor ratified that new test of
eligibility. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292
(2001); Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517, 532 (1994).
86 See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989);
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48
(1936).
87 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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patent system to human creativity in the “useful
Arts,”88 and would impede rather than “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”89
As discussed in the Court of Appeals by some
of the Amici here,90 and in other amicus briefs filed
in this Court, all three constitutional limits are
exceeded when patents issue for non-inventive
applications of science, nature, and ideas. As discussed above, such claims directly conflict with the
Constitution’s limit to “Discoveries” of “Inventors.”
Further, as this Court held in Graham v. John Deere
Co., the patent power is “limited to the promotion of
advances in the ‘useful arts,’” and Congress may not
“enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the
innovation, advancement or social benefit gained
thereby.”91 Patents on non-inventive applications
lack any creative, technological advance, and thus
cross whatever line marks the border of the useful
arts. Similarly, lacking the quid pro quo of disclosed
technological advance, such patents create odious
88 Id. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Center for Advanced Study
and Research in Intellectual Property (CASRIP) and Research
Affiliate Scholars at 12-20 (discussing the limits of the “useful
Arts”).
89 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29 (1991)
(discussing the effects of patents on sequential innovation).
90 See Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors, In re Bilski,
Appeal No. 2007-1130 (Fed. Cir.), at 6–10.
91 383 U.S. at 5–6.
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monopolies and impede, rather than promote, scientific and technological progress.92
Such a broad interpretation of Section 101
would seriously and adversely affect innovation.
Without invention in the application, patents would
foreclose many (even if they do not preempt all) uses
of scientific discoveries, including uses in further
scientific and technological research. Eligibility for
such claims would reward too little invention (or
would impermissibly reward scientific discovery),
while burdening too much sequential scientific
discovery and technological invention.
The adverse effects on further scientific and
technological development are particularly salient in
light of the Court of Appeals recent expansive interpretation of the statutory infringement right to deny
a meaningful exception for scientific experiments.93
In contrast, science, nature, and ideas are the infrastructure for technological and other progress, and
either sufficient incentives already exist or there are

92 See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (the patent laws reflect a “careful balance”
between promoting innovation and permitting imitation);
Walterscheid, Study, supra, at 31–58 (discussing the antimonopoly origins of the patent power under English and
colonial law); 1 Robinson, supra, at 51-52 (distinguishing
patents from odious monopolies in that the technological
advance supplies the rights that the public would otherwise
enjoy).
93 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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better alternatives for society than patents for the
discovery of such infrastructure.94
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
affirm the rejection of the patent claims at issue and
hold that patent eligibility requires invention in the
application of any previously known or newly discovered science, nature, or ideas.
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94 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Ten Law Professors, at 11
n.20.
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